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KEY POINTS
• Local agreements in the eastern Congo have been used as an instrument to 
dismantle armed rebellions, to settle land conflicts and other forms of com-
munity disputes, and to deal with interpersonal feuds. 
• Due to mutual distrust between communities stemming from a long history of 
tensions and violence, and given the fragmentation of the approaches taken, 
mediation efforts and subsequent local agreements have had limited effect in 
tackling conflicts and violence and even seem to bypass them. 
• Given a context in which violence and conflict have become part of commu-
nities’ history and are fueled by a particularly unstable national and regional 
context, many dialogues and related agreements address the symptoms of 
conflicts rather than their causes and have limited impact on the behavior of 
actors of power. 
 
• The lessons learned from experienced Participatory Action Research (PAR) 
and dialogue programmes implemented by specialized organizations, the 
working of local structures set up by these organizations, and emerging me-
diation efforts and agreements may be useful in addressing the causes rather 
than the symptoms of conflict.  
• There is a need to move beyond a tendency towards formality as signed agree-
ments are seen as a measure of success, instead of being considered as a tool 
for a longer process towards forthcoming ‘real dialogue’ on specific issues 
raised during the PAR’s round tables.  
• Donors should encourage and finance long-term peace programmes and 
subsequent ‘dialogues’ addressing conflict dynamics and involving key actors 
from the grassroots to the highest level. This approach should include PAR 
and analysis components which might bring more knowledge to conflicts and 
help move beyond the simplistic narratives that are often used to fuel them.
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INTRODUCTION
The end of the 1998-2003 Congolese war was symbolised by the 
signing of the ‘All-Inclusive Agreement’ in Pretoria in December 
2002. However, due to the continued proliferation of national and 
foreign armed groups as well as unaddressed community grievances, 
this agreement did not bring peace and stability to the Kivu and 
Ituri Provinces (Boshoff and Hoebeke 2008), or the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC) as a whole. On 9 November 2007, 
the Governments of the DRC and Rwanda reached an agreement 
whereby the DRC agreed to forcibly disarm the Rwandan Hutu 
insurgent group (the Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du 
Rwanda) on its soil. After several rounds of negotiations between the 
Congolese government and 22 armed groups, as part of the Amani 
Peace Process, on 23 January 2008, the “actes d’engagements” (shared 
commitments) were signed in Goma. Several other agreements 
followed, between warring partners, between communities, and 
between other opposing parties. The most recent example includes 
a peace agreement, signed in February 2020, between the Congolese 
government and the Force de Résistance Patriotique de l’Ituri 
(Patriotic Resistance Force of Ituri (FRPI), the largest armed group 
still operating in the Ituri province. These examples show a broader 
trend in which “local agreements” in the eastern DRC are used as 
an instrument to dismantle armed rebellions, settle land conflicts, 
and other forms of community disputes – but also, increasingly, to 
deal with localized disputes between individual farmers and family 
members.  
 This briefing focuses on these local agreements and mediation 
efforts that attempt to reduce land-related conflict and violence in 
North Kivu, South Kivu, and Ituri. How do conflict protagonists and 
peace-builders reach such agreements? What are their approaches? 
Who are the actors involved? How are they successful, and what 
are the challenges they face? To what extent do local agreements 
forge peace at the grassroots level, and under which conditions do 
they prevent or feed renewed violence? Through an analysis of these 
questions, this briefing aims to shed light on the processes that lead to 
these “local agreements’’ and to investigate whether such agreements 
are an efficient instrument for conflict resolution. For reasons of 
consistency and given their multitude, “local agreements” here refer 
to a wide range of written documents resulting from mediation 
efforts at the local, provincial, and regional levels. These include the 
“plan d’action” (action plans), “plan de paix” (peace plan), “actes 
d’engagements”, “plan social” (social plan), etc. 
 Local agreements foster changes in conflict dynamics through 
the inclusion of key stakeholders in the search for durable peace. This 
briefing argues that (i) due to mutual distrust between communities 
that stem from a long history of tensions and violence, and (ii) given 
the widespread tendency to consider signed agreements as a measure 
of success rather than a tool for a longer process of peacebuilding, 
mediation efforts and local agreements have not succeeded in tackling 
violent conflict; rather they seem to bypass them. Therefore, there is a 
need to support long-term peace programs that not only aim to tackle 
the root causes of conflicts, but that also encourage coordination 
between the different organizations engaged in addressing them 
(Bouvy and Lange 2012).
CONGO’S ENDURING FRAGILITY
In eastern Congo, local agreements are considered a tool for peace. 
Without being exhaustive, we find that between 2006 and February 
2020, more than fifteen were signed in North Kivu, South Kivu, and 
Ituri provinces (see annexed table 1 below). 
 Despite the existence of signed agreements, change seems 
to remain elusive (Ndahinda 2019). An August 2019 update by 
the Congo Research Group identified more than 130 armed groups 
in the two Kivu provinces, including 82 groups operating in the 
South Kivu province alone.2 In both Kivu provinces, armed actors 
pose as public authorities, claiming the right to govern populations, 
resources, and territories (Vlassenroot et al. 2016). Cattle looting and 
acts of extortion are recurrent phenomena (Verweijen and Brabant 
2017; Ntayoma 2019; Hoffmann et all 2020); ethnic grievances are 
pervasive, and land disputes and conflicts over customary power are 
omnipresent in most rural areas (Van Acker 2005). A recent press 
release by the International Crisis Group warns of an alarming 
resumption of proxy violence, with the involvement of Rwandan 
and Burundian armies as well as their armed opponents in the Uvira 
territory (South Kivu).3 Local agreements are often mobilized in an 
attempt to reduce the levels of violence caused by these issues. Yet, at 
the same time, they demonstrate the key weaknesses of the Congolese 
state in its struggle to recover from complex and intricate political and 
security constellations rooted in and connected to regional fragility 
(Life & Peace Institute 2011; ICG 2020).
ACTORS AND APPROACHES TO LOCAL AGREEMENTS 
Mediation efforts and local agreements are usually initiated through 
four main processes: i) participatory peace programming, often 
implemented through Participatory Action Research (PAR); ii) 
support or creation of local structures for conflict mediation; 
iii) intercommunity provincial Barza, and iv) direct negotiations 
between conflict protagonists.   
 The PAR experiments are conducted by national and 
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international NGOs. In Participatory Action Research experiments, 
customary chiefs, civil society representatives, politicians,  and 
entrepreneurs (e.g., landholders) take on the research findings and 
participate in an inter-community dialogue. Participants then sign 
onto an agreement to settle their disputes, agree on an action plan, 
and participate in the structures set up to make the research findings 
and agreement/plan operational. Thus, PAR comprises three main 
steps: i) knowledge production by placing communities affected by 
conflict and their experiences at the centre of the research process; ii) 
a round table to initiate discussions on concrete actions for conflict 
resolution and; iii) actions as practical solutions to solve the conflict. 
 The second approach to promote, and enforce compliance 
with local agreements is through the initiation of mediation efforts 
by existing or newly created local structures. Given the fact that local 
peace processes tend to be ‘NGO-driven’ and are often limited in scope, 
such mediation efforts address only parts of signed peace agreements. 
Local structures with various denominations (such as “commissions,” 
“noyaux,” “antennes”, “cadres,” etc.) are usually compromise of 
delegates from different communities or groups within communities 
that have the mandate to mediate local conflicts. In the absence of a 
reliable or functional justice system, these mediation mechanisms are 
presented as the best possible strategy to provide some form of (legal) 
protection for rural populations and to settle disputes affecting local 
cohabitation.  Mostly introduced by local civil society organisations 
and supported by international development actors, these extra-
judicial conflict-management mechanisms also respond to growing 
local demand for justice and dispute resolution.
 These mechanisms mostly deal with family feuds, and land-
related conflicts between individual farmers and are based on the 
customary tradition of conciliation. For instance, in Kalehe and 
Kabare territories (South Kivu), the Congolese NGO Action pour 
la Paix et la Concorde (APC) has created more than 30 Cadres de 
Dialogue et de Médiation (CDM) and a similar number of noyaux de 
paix (peace clusters). CDM’s mediation between conflicting parties 
is sanctioned by an ‘acte de compromis’ between them. In Walungu 
and Kabare (South Kivu) the organisation Innovation et Formation 
pour le Développment et la Paix (IFDP) initiated the Groupes de 
Réflexion sur les Questions Foncières (GRQF) and brought together 
representatives from the population in collaborative structures 
to reflect on land access norms. In Uvira and Fizi (South Kivu), a 
number of Cadres de Concertation Inter-communautaires (CCI) are 
operational and were technically and financially supported by Life 
and Peace Institute (LPI) until 2015. In Masisi (North Kivu), Action 
Solidaire pour la Paix (ASP) has put in place a number of Cadres 
Inter-paysans de Plaidoyer pour la Transformation des Conflicts 
(CIPTC) to address issues such as insecurity, land conflicts, and 
illegal roadblocks. In 2017 in South Lubero (North Kivu), the Centre 
d’Etude Juridique Appliqué (CEJA) initiated a dozen ‘groupes de 
dialogue permanent’ that are dealing with land-related disputes. 
 The inter-community Barza (Barza intercommunautaire), 
which is mostly operational at the provincial or urban level, can also 
be seen as a structure of conflict mediation (Clark 2008). In these 
Barza, ethnic communities are represented through their mutualité, 
which is a social support structure that brings together members 
of the same ethnic community to make political claims. These 
Barza are involved in various kinds of identity-based mediation and 
bring together delegates from different ethnic groups for dialogue, 
especially during clashes affecting ethnic cohabitation in rural areas 
that affect social cohesion. The Barza also plays a key role in the 
political system by encouraging ethnic representation in provincial 
governments. In this regard, the Barza’s members are consulted to 
propose candidates for nomination as ministers, thereby facilitating 
a kind of ethnic equilibrium in provincial governments.
 Finally, mediation efforts led by church leaders, clan elders, 
and other public figures to reduce violence also include direct 
negotiations between armed protagonists. The aim has mainly 
been to stop hostilities between armed groups and to offer them a 
share of a peace-dividend such as military integration, or to assist 
them in demobilizing their troops. Over the last two decades, 
negotiations involving armed groups and targeting their dismantling 
or integration into the Forces Armées de la République Démocratique 
du Congo (FARDC) have seen considerable shifts. In most instances, 
the negotiation process took place directly between the Congolese 
government (or a commission acting on its behalf) and armed groups 
with the backing of the Mission des Nations Unies pour la Stabilisation 
du Congo (MONUSCO) and other international players.
WHEN AND WHY DO MEDIATION AND LOCAL 
AGREEMENTS FAIL?
Actors’ diversity: Experience shows that in eastern Congo, local 
peace agreements involve a diversity of actors with divergent interests 
in the conflict (Bouvy 2010: 43). Signed agreements have a limited 
effect on the conduct of armed actors and their political alliances and 
should only be considered a first step in the transformation of conflict 
dynamics. Political support is critical to their longer-term impact and 
success. Local organisations facilitating inter-community dialogue 
or promoting negotiations between politico-military actors do not 
have the power or capacity to apply the necessary pressure on those 
actors, who are decisive in reversing logics of armed mobilisation and 
violence. ‘Bottom-up peacebuilding’ initiatives are also often unable 
to connect processes of community mobilization at the local level 
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to the political engagement of authorities or other stakeholders at 
higher levels (i.e., provincial, national, regional). This suggests that a 
‘bottom-up’ approach is easily limited to ‘community peacebuilding,’ 
rendering peace efforts weak, limited to local actors (Hoffmann et al. 
2018), and prone to attacks by armed groups often undoing valiant 
local reconciliation efforts (Stearns et al. 2017).
Legitimacy: Other challenges include the lack of legitimacy of 
delegates participating in these negotiations, short term perspectives 
of donor organisations; and the adverse effects of incentives offered 
to involved parties. Participatory peace programming so far has failed 
to achieve the legitimacy necessary to produce sustainable change. 
Although PAR processes allow for the collection of useful knowledge 
on existing conflict dynamics and drivers and open space for dialogue 
between different community-based leaderships, one of the principal 
causes of their failure relates to the fact that these dialogues (or round 
tables) are often considered ‘for-show social events.’ Concluding a 
round table with the signing of an agreement between the conflict 
protagonists following several days of reflection, discussions, and 
sometimes antagonism is generally considered a one-off event. Often, 
instead of focusing on a long-term process of change towards peace 
and stability, round tables are also unable to move beyond the clichés 
or stereotypical thinking about what shapes conflict, and in the worst 
case, even reproduce existing conflict dynamics (Morvan and Nzweve 
2010). Round tables also fail to tackle issues such as conflictive 
identity, ethnic resentment, manipulation of local actors by 
politicians and military entrepreneurs, and diverging interpretations 
of historical events (Vlassenroot 2002). 
Structural issues: Additionally, research findings presented during 
round tables initiate discussions, but these discussions often remain 
superficial and ephemeral. They rarely address the structural causes 
of conflicts or their connections to national and regional dynamics 
or embrace many issues and objectives at the same time. Moreover, 
they often lack good facilitation and tend to be overly driven by 
donor interests. A round-table held by LPI’s partners in March 2010 
is a good illustration of these issues.5 As a global strategy to address 
decades of conflicts in Uvira and Fizi, the action plan following this 
round-table resembled a shopping list of actions and identified three 
major dimensions of conflict to be tackled: i) community support to 
armed groups; ii) land conflicts and iii) the administrative governance 
of entities. These dimensions are so complex that it is hardly possible 
to address them in the short term and without more considerable 
(political) support and buy-in. Given an existing context where 
violence and conflict have their roots in the communities’ history and 
are fueled by a particularly unstable national and regional context, 
many dialogues and subsequent agreements address the symptoms 
of conflict rather than root causes. It is worth mentioning here that 
these weaknesses in implementing the PAR process do not necessarily 
mean that this approach is not at all useful. Instead, it seems that the 
organizations that are supposed to facilitate such dialogues do it in a 
superficial way and that ambitions are seldom realistic. These results 
can be justified because the existing ‘opportunity’ structure does not 
allow for more realistic ambitions: civil society organisations seldom 
have the authority or power to address underlying causes and conflict 
dynamics. Consequently, a superficial process will never reach any 
meaningful result. 
Temporality: Related to this, donors usually do not favor long-term 
research and programming on conflict and peace. Many civil society 
organizations implementing participatory research on conflict 
(e.g., PAR) are confined by the linearity of project cycles, including 
i) data collection; ii) round table and signed agreements; iii) and 
actions aimed at conflict transformation. In such cycles, dialogues 
and signed agreements are viewed as the highest achievement for 
involved organizations and their donors, ticking a box to satisfy 
donors, auditors, or political constituencies in donor countries. 
With this in mind, there is a tendency towards formality, as signed 
agreements are seen as the organisation’s measure of success instead 
of being considered a tool for a longer process of ‘real dialogue’ on 
specific issues raised during the round table. It is observed that many 
organizations often have to conclude the process of dialogue at the 
very point when the necessary conditions for a long term dialogue 
and search for conflict resolution strategies are finally achieved. In 
most cases, donor funding ends with the signing of a peace agreement, 
which is considered to be a sufficient result in itself. 
Violence Dividend: Similarly, negotiations between armed 
belligerents and/or their political representatives have also often 
focused on the signing of an agreement to end hostilities or to 
demobilise. These negotiations have produced only limited long-
lasting conflict-reducing effects, or have been fundamentally flawed 
right from the start. They have offered these groups an additional form 
of legitimacy and have opened doors to an endless negotiation process 
that, in turn, opens the door to impunity for the use of violence, and 
to the possibility of renewed activity should the concluded agreement 
no longer be considered beneficial. Also, these negotiations allow 
armed group leaders to gain access to military grades and positions 
within state security services, hence enforcing impunity by rewarding 
the use of armed violence rather than condemning it (Verweijen and 
Wakenge 2015). As a consequence, these negotiations have not been 
able to break the cycle of violence but, in many cases, have provided an 
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additional impetus to beef up the number of combatants or to return 
to the bush. Power-sharing was the key strategy to reduce violence, 
yet ‘led to constant negotiations aimed at integrating factions into 
the armed forces and the politico-administrative apparatus. As 
the factions with the biggest capacity to inflict violence obtained 
the most important positions, incentives were created for groups 
to retain or rebuild military capacity’ (Vlassenroot & Verweijen, 
2017). It has been one of the reasons why the Congolese government 
eventually shifted towards the use of military strategies to deal with 
the proliferation of armed groups.  
Ownership: The operationalization of local agreements and peace 
deals remains a major challenge and is also impeded by an ambiguous 
legitimacy. Delegate representativeness often signing agreements 
on behalf of the delegates in the room.  It is often not clear to what 
extent the signatories of an agreement that are acting as delegates of 
communities (including sometimes contested customary chiefs) or 
armed groups are the most credible figures within their constituencies, 
why, and how these individuals were selected, and by whom. A recent 
example adds credence to this observation. In December 2019, the 
Commission Interprovinciale d’appui au processus de Sensibilisation, 
Désarmement, Démobilisation et Réintegration Communautaire 
(CIAP-DDRC) held a meeting (in Murhesa, near Bukavu) gathering 
38 delegates of armed groups. The main objective of the meeting was 
to sensitize armed actors to join the Congolese army or to reintegrate 
into civilian life. During the meeting, the absence of prominent 
armed group leaders raised doubts about the legitimacy of the 
delegates representing them and about the seriousness of armed 
actors to engage in the process. At the same time, in such meetings, 
(foreign) political sponsors are absent, the victims of human rights 
abuses and other stakeholders went unsolicited, which in some cases 
left the impression that signed agreements are ‘une affaire des autres’ 
(someone’s else business) (Abekyamwali 2007). Also, compliance 
with the terms of the agreement is generally on a voluntary basis. 
Representativeness: The inter-community Barza is equally 
fragilized by issues of representativeness. It is not clear to what 
extent representatives of the mutualités are legitimate in the eyes of 
their community members. Also, questions remain as to how the 
composition and work of these Barza have been politicised by those 
authorities with whom many civil society organizations are reluctant 
to engage because of different views on peacebuilding (Bilak, 2009). 
Analysis of the Barza in North Kivu shows that despite the potential 
of contributing to a reduction of ethnic tension, it has been a huge 
challenge to prevent external interference and to transcend ethnic 
divisions as a condition to facilitate a real dialogue (Clark, 2008).
Donor Dependence: When finally looking at local mediation efforts 
dealing with localized tensions and conflict (usually centered around 
land access), inclusiveness is a key factor explaining their success. 
Even if, in most cases, their impact is limited in scope and time, their 
participatory approach gives them a significant level of local legitimacy. 
The effects of such initiatives can even go beyond land conflict-
related issues as their inclusiveness also provides some opportunities 
for larger-scale reconciliation and peacebuilding. Obviously, such 
approaches have a limited effect on the underlying causes of land 
disputes, which in most cases are left unaddressed, either because 
they are considered to be too complex or because of a lack of impact 
on powerful actors involved in these conflicts. Nevertheless, they can 
reduce existing tensions and promote grassroots cohabitation. In 
most cases, though, such initiatives suffer from a strong dependence 
on external funding, a lack of coordination between a multitude of 
initiatives, and limited political support. The role of donor agencies 
is often experienced as crucial, which causes concerns about the 
sustainability of initiatives once donors are no longer involved. Also, 
mediation efforts often lack the means to enforce decisions, which 
risks undermining the durability of mediation and arbitration 
outcomes. So, their activities can only be sustainable if administrative 
and political authorities support them. Although local structures are 
often officially recognized, their cooperation with public authorities 
is not institutionalized as the latter do not technically or financially 
support these structures and the actions planned for peacebuilding. 
Good Practices: Nevertheless, outcomes of such mediation efforts, 
as well as other local agreements can include a legal dimension that 
enhances their impact in the longer term. Official recognition of 
land conflict mediation can lead to more sustainable arrangements 
that reduce tension at a local level. One example is the upgrading 
of mediation mechanisms through the promulgation of provincial 
edicts aimed at improving land security for small farmers by 
reasserting the responsibilities of customary chiefs. Promulgated in 
2011 by the Governor of North Kivu (Julien Paluku), a provincial 
edict on land governance resulted from several dialogue initiatives 
including customary chiefs, landholders, and farmers and initiated 
by Forum des Amis de la Terre (FAT). In 2015, the Governor of 
South Kivu, Marcellin Cishambo signed a decree (N°19/008/GP/
SK) on the regulation of the transhumance of cattle, one of the main 
drivers of recurrent conflict in Fizi and Uvira territories (Brabant 
and Nzweve 2013; Verweijen and Brabant 2017). This decree was 
the result of a number of consultations and inter-community 
dialogue. Overall, such provincial decrees challenge the prevalence 
of informal methods of regulation and allow conflict protagonists 
to move beyond the voluntary character of complying through 
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signed agreements. Nevertheless, it has to be acknowledged that 
the implementation of such edicts is often fraught with several 
constraints related to the complexity of the problems to be addressed 
and a weak implementation capacity by state institutions and civil 
society organisations.
CONCLUSION AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
From the above analysis, it can be concluded that in the case of 
eastern Congo, local peace agreements have been widely used as 
a means to address conflict dynamics. Despite the weaknesses 
discussed in this research brief, local agreements have the potential 
to engage the protagonists of conflict in the search for a durable 
peace. However, these agreements only have a long-lasting impact if 
a number of conditions are in place. It must be stated though that 
such agreements can only contribute to peacebuilding and will never 
be sufficient to address the causes of conflict if not connected to more 
comprehensive strategies with bigger scopes. In an analysis of security 
governance in Ituri, conflict dynamics in most cases are too complex 
for bottom-up approaches to tackle and thus that the ambitions of 
such approaches should be realistic. The same analysis also shows 
that the processes leading to such agreements always challenge other 
actors’ positions and thus should be considered highly political as 
well (Hoffmann et al., 2016).  
 Local peace agreements can contribute to and be part of lasting 
peace if they add to the understanding of conflict, and act upon 
its root causes, rather than just its symptoms. Such a contribution 
depends on the existence of a permanent process of dialogue that 
builds on and goes beyond signed agreements. This requires that a 
number of crucial conditions are met. First, donors should encourage 
and finance long-term research and programming on conflict 
dynamics. It is imperative that organizations engaged in conflict 
management gather detailed knowledge of the conflict dynamics in 
the areas where they operate (Morvan and Nzweve 2010: 51). The 
lessons learned from past PAR processes and the performance of local 
structures related to mediation efforts and inter-community dialogue 
and agreements may be useful in this regard. Second, recent research 
on peace processes questions the relevance of supporting specialized 
organizations. In eastern DRC, decades of conflict have led to the 
mushrooming of opportunist peacebuilding rganizations6 who claim 
fields of expertise in areas of intervention that rarely connect (Müller 
and Wakenge 2019). Even though these areas allow for expanding 
their financing opportunities, few organizations have developed well-
adjusted peacebuilding responses and programmes. Third, in this 
context of mushrooming organisations engaged in peace building, 
there is a need for donors to encourage concerted and coordinated 
approaches to conflict transformation. The Cluster protection7 that 
exists resembles an unclear mixture of organizations with a hybrid 
approach based both on human rights violations (denunciation) and 
those engaged in negotiation/mediation efforts. This renders difficult 
the coordination of their approaches. 
 The impact of mediation efforts and local agreements on 
the larger peace process also suffers from a lack of engagement with 
customary and other political authorities, and of the absence of a 
policy dealing with armed groups’ impunity. Beyond recognizing 
mediation outcomes, promulgating provincial edicts, participating 
in sessions held by civil society organizations or local structures 
regarding mediation, and the cosmetic celebration of signing 
agreements including with armed groups, the ability of Congolese 
authorities to render these agreements successful is limited. At every 
policy level, authorities fail to conceive of comprehensive peace 
programmes and to take measures to tackle impunity. The same 
authorities have outsourced their responsibilities to civil society 
organisations and donors, and do not provide any budgetary support 
to existing programmes. Supporting such programmes is viewed as 
an international community’s affair. This lack of engagement and 
participation by Congolese authorities undermines the durability of 
mediation efforts and needs to be reversed. At the same time, peace 
agreements can only be successful if the relevant politico-military 
networks are directly involved in them. 
 The general failure to make local agreements tangible reveals 
the weaknesses of peace interventions in eastern DRC. After about 
20 years of peacebuilding interventions, donors should ask the 
question why these interventions have not addressed conflict causes 
more effectively. While there is no easy answer to this question, 
it partly relates to what can be described as the “ordinary peace 
business’’ that has become characteristic of peace interventions. This 
business suggests that many CSO’s implement peace initiatives but 
are aware that the results are flawed from the start and thus will be 
limited. Nevertheless, they are eager to do so because of the incentives 
offered by international donors who ironically want to continue their 
investment in peace and stabilisation strategies despite the limited 
results. If the aim is to move forward, there is an urgent need to reflect 
on the responsibilities of donors, and international and national 
organizations in the persistence of such a peacebuilding model.
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ENDNOTES
1  Authors are respectively Associate Professor of Social Sciences, 
Institut Supérieur de Développement Rural, ISDR-Bukavu, Congo 
(claudeigumaw@gmail.com) and Professor of Political and Social 
Sciences, Ghent University, Belgium (Koen.Vlassenroot@Ugent.
be). They fondly thank Alexis Bouvy, Aymar Nyenyezi Bisoka and 
Kasper Hoffman for their  useful comments.
2  Congo Research Group, Congo, Forgotten: The Numbers Behind 
Africa’s Longest Humanitarian Crisis, Center on International 
Cooperation, New York University, August 2019.
3  On the same account, see Ruhumbuzi Delphin Ntayoma. 
Genocide Warning: The vulnerability of Banyamulenge ‘Invaders’, 
ISS Working paper, November 2019 and Battory J. and Vircoulon 
T. 2009. La province du Sud-Kivu : Un champ de bataille 
multidimensionnel méconnu. Notes de l’IFRI.
4  The current UN stabilization mission MONUSCO is composed 
of over 20,000 personnel at a yearly cost of more than 1 billion 
USD. For details, see MONUSCO Fact Sheet, accessed on 12 
October 2019.
5  The LPI’s partners were the Réseau d’Innovation 
Organisationnelle (RIO), Action pour la Paix et le Développement 
Endogènes (ADEPAE) and Arche d’Alliance.
6 Morvan and Nzweve identified 171 organizations in North and 
South Kivu.
7  Working under the United Nations Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), this cluster coordinates 
and provides inter-agency policy advice and guidance on the 
implementation of peace programmes and responses to human right 
violations.
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Nº
1
8
2
9
3
10
4
11
5
12
6
13
7
14
15
Organiser
Congolese
government
Congolese
government
Armed groups
Armed groups
Community 
leaders, Barza 
members 
Force 
de résistance 
patriotique de 
l’Ituri (FRPI)
Bunia N/A
N/A
N/A
Irumu  
Uvira
Buisha and 
South-Lubero
N/A
N/A
Project of 
agreement 
N/A
N/A
Negotiation
Negotiation
Negotiation
Negotiation
Negotiation
Negotiation
Agreement Insecurity
Insecurity
Insecurity
2006 MONUSCO 
MONUSCO 
MONUSCO 
I-4 S
I-4 S
N/A
N/A
MONUSCO 
and LCI
EPER 
SWISSE
CORDAID and 
PNUD
LPI/Swedish 
International 
Development 
Agency (SIDA) 
LPI/SIDA 
LPI
N/A
LPI &
International 
Alert 
2008
2010
2011
2011
2016
2017
2017
2018
2018
2019
2020
2019
2013/
2014
2013/
2018
Insecurity
Land conflict, 
insecurity and 
poor governance 
Land conflict
Land conflict
Land conflict
Land conflict
Land conflict
Land conflict
Land conflict
Transhumance Agreement
Agreement
Agreement
Agreement
Agreement
Actes 
d’engagement
Action plan 
Actes 
d’engagements 
Actes 
d’engagement 
Action plan
Action plan
Action plan
Negotiation
Negotiation
Negotiation
PAR
PAR
PAR
PAR
PAR
PAR
Nord and South-
Kivu
Fizi and Uvira 
Kalehe
Fizi and Uvira
Goma
Bukavu
Bukavu
Bukavu
Bukavu
Geti/Bunia 
South-Lubero
Kirumba 
Kabare 
Rutshuru 
Murhesa 
Kabare 
Buito
South-Kivu
Uvira and 
Baraka 
Masisi Masisi
MasisiGoma and 
Masisi 
Armed groups
Community
leaders
Community
leaders
Cattle keepers
and farmers
Land holders
and farmers
Land holders
and farmers
Land holders
Land holders
Land holders
and farmers
Land holders
and community
leaders
Barza members 
Congolese
government
Arche d’alliance, 
Reseau 
d’Innovation 
Organisationnelle 
(RIO) and ADEPAE
Action 
Communautaire 
pour le 
Développement 
Intégral (ACDI)
Conseil 
Régional des 
Organisations non-
Gouvernementales 
de Développement 
(CRONGD)
CIAP-DDRC and 
Initiative pour un 
Leadeship Cohésif 
(ILC)
Association pour 
le Développement 
Intégré (ACDI)
Pole Institute and 
Aide et Action pour 
la Paix (AAP)
APC
Centre d’Etude 
Judirique 
Appliquée CEJA
Arche d’alliance, 
RIO and ADEPAE
International
Alert
ASP
APC
Venue ApproachActors
Involved
Areas
Concerned
Type of
Agreement
Major
Issue Year
Donor
Tableau 1. Local agreements in North Kivu, South Kivu and Ituri (2006-2020)
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